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“I swear by Apollo the physician, and Aesculapius . . . that, according to my ability
and judgment, I will keep this Oath . . . . I will follow that system of regimen which,
according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and
abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. . . . With purity and with
holiness I will pass my life and practise my Art.”1
—The Genuine Works of Hippocrates
INTRODUCTION
One of the core tenets of Western medicine, dating back to the Hippocratic
Corpus,2 is the principle of primum est ut non nocere,3 or “first, do no harm.”4
To this day, the Hippocratic Oath is delivered at medical school graduations
around the country and new doctors swear to uphold this ancient idea.5 The
practice of modern medicine, though technologically far removed from Ancient
Greece, is still an art as well as a science.6 The scientific elements of medicine
may be based on clinical trials and may reach reasonably certain conclusions,
but the artistic side of medicine leaves room for a clinician’s judgment.7 The
unfortunate reality is that doctors will, in the normal course of practicing
medicine, inevitably make mistakes.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2012, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas.
1 HIPPOCRATES, THE GENUINE WORKS OF HIPPOCRATES 779–80 (Francis Adams trans., Les-
lie Adams, Spec. Ed. 1985) (1849) (emphasis omitted).
2 See generally The Hippocratic Corpus, U. VA. HEATH SYS. CLAUDE MOORE HEALTH SCI.
LIBR., http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/artifacts/antiqua/humoral.cfm (last visited Nov.
20, 2011).
3 THOMAS INMAN, ON THE RESTORATION OF HEALTH 165 (London, H.K. Lewis, 2nd ed.
1872).
4 Id.
5 Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001), http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratice-oath-today.html.
6 N.H. Tucker, III, President’s Message—Medicine: Art Versus Science, JACKSONVILLE
MED., Dec. 1999, http://www.dcmsonline.org/jax-medicine/1999journals/december99/pres
mess.htm.
7 Id.
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Preventable medical errors still happen and cost close to 100,000 U.S.
lives every year,8 despite the medical community’s commitment to the ideals
espoused in the Hippocratic Oath. Medical malpractice litigation is the logical
result of these errors, with patient-plaintiffs seeking compensation for their
injuries.9 State legislatures enacted a wide variety of reforms to combat frivo-
lous medical malpractice litigation.10 Nevada’s chosen statutory reforms are a
cap on noneconomic damages11 and an expanded pleading statute.12 A large
part of Nevada’s medical malpractice reform scheme rests on shaky ground,
due to possible inconsistencies between the statutory language of NRS 41A.071
and Nevada’s common law.13 The critical importance of medical malpractice
reform and its susceptibility to legal challenge require legislatures to give
reform the attention it demands.
This Note proposes that the Nevada legislature must amend NRS 41A.071
so that the plain language of the statute directly mirrors the underlying statutory
intent and public policy. Part I briefly discusses three of the most common
legislative responses to the perceived need for tort reform: noneconomic dam-
ages caps, screening panels, and expanded pleading standards. Part II discusses
Nevada’s legislative response to the medical malpractice crisis of 2002 and the
subsequent adoption and interpretation of NRS 41A.071. Part III evaluates the
current interpretation of NRS 41A.071 and the apparent conflict with Nevada’s
common law rules of statutory interpretation. Part IV(A) proposes an amended
and restructured version of NRS 41A.071, constructed expressly to alleviate the
concerns brought to light in Part III. Part IV(B) critically examines each section
of the proposed amended statute. This Note concludes by examining the poten-
tial impact of the proposed amended statute and its effect on tort reform in
Nevada.
I. THE COMMON LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TORT REFORM
Legislative responses to medical malpractice crises have varied, and an
examination of these responses serves as a useful background for the discussion
of tort reform in Nevada. Throughout the twentieth century, federal and state
legislatures enacted specific policies to limit tort claims, guide juries in finding
liability, and force the common law to listen to public policy concerns.14 More
recent developments in common law and statutory tort reform include states
adopting comparative negligence laws, frequently at the expense of contribu-
tory negligence, and reducing the plaintiff’s burden of proof in civil cases.15
8 Claudia Kalb, Do No Harm, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 2010, at 48.
9 F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 437, 441–42 (2006).
10 See generally id. at 469–79.
11 NEV. REV. STAT. §41A.035 (2009).
12 Id. at §41A.071.
13 Micah S. Echols, Can Savings Statutes Cure the Failure to Attach a Medical Malpractice
Affidavit to a Complaint?, COMMUNIQUE, Nov. 2010, at 16, 18, available at http://www.
clarkcountybar.org (follow “Communique” pull down menu; then follow “Past Articles”
hyperlink; then follow “November 2010” hyperlink).
14 Hubbard, supra note 9, at 468.
15 Id.
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Following an unprecedented boom in the number of medical malpractice cases
filed in the 1970s,16 legislatures across the nation undertook broad efforts to
reform insurance law and tort law as a whole.17 Actual legislative remedies
varied, creating little uniformity among the states. These remedies included
imposing caps on noneconomic damages,18 altering or expanding the pleading
standard for medical malpractice litigation, and forming screening panels19 to
hear cases before those claims made it to the district courts.20
The public policy rationale for limiting noneconomic damages stems
almost entirely from a desire to curtail medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums.21 Critics argue that large pain-and-suffering damage awards fail to truly
compensate a plaintiff for a real injury, even if that injury is difficult to quan-
tify.22 For example, one critic pointed out that “even though pain and mental
trauma are ‘real’ injury costs, these noneconomic injuries have no equivalent
dollar value that will ‘fix’ or ‘replace’ these psychic injuries.”23
Those who oppose a legislative limitation on noneconomic damages fre-
quently do so by arguing in favor of the deterrent effect that large damage
awards can have on future potential offenders.24 Opponents also argue that ris-
ing insurance premiums are easily attributable to insurance company invest-
ment patterns.25  Opponents further argue that cyclical downturns in the
financial markets—not expansive jury awards—dictate the rise and fall of
insurance costs.26 Despite the arguments against noneconomic damages caps
and the evidence refuting their efficacy as a remedy for rising malpractice
insurance rates, 21 states currently have some form of statutory cap in place.27
16 Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legisla-
tion to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 181 (1990).
17 Id. at 182; see also Hubbard, supra note 9, at 468–69.
18 Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for Nonmonetary Losses: An Integrated Answer to the
Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation of Noneconomic Damages, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 193, 265–66 (2009). Zavos defines noneconomic damages as “a symbolic sum
that the jury determines will offset a loss that cannot be eliminated by that sum.” Id. at 248.
19 Macchiaroli, supra note 16, at 186. This Note will use the term “screening panel” to refer
to a legal entity created for the purpose of pretrial evaluation of medical malpractice claims.
20 See id. at 182 nn.4–5; Hubbard, supra note 9, at 483–84.
21 Hubbard, supra note 9, at 493–94.
22 See id. at 493.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 494.
25 Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises
Behind “Tort Reform”, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 357, 364 n.32 (2005).
26 Id.
27 ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (2007); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (2005 & Supp. 2011–12); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-228c (2005 & Supp.
2011); FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 6-1603 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (West 2011); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.1483 (1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2008); MO. STAT. § 538.210 (2008);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:15-5.14 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-42-02 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-1708.1F-1 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010–11) (expired Nov. 1, 2010); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (West 2002
& Supp. 2011); Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (2006). This list does not count several states where
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As an alternative or supplement to damage caps, some states implemented
statutory schemes creating screening panels tasked with evaluating medical
malpractice claims.28 The screening panels varied in form from state to state,
though there are some common characteristics.29 The screening panels were
typically staffed by a mix of doctors, lawyers, and judges, and the panels issued
opinions regarding the negligence of health care providers in medical malprac-
tice actions.30 Law makers in some states granted screening panels express
authority to offer opinions on damages, though those opinions did not carry the
weight of a binding arbitration award.31 Supporters of the screening panels saw
them as a way to expedite medical malpractice litigation, ushering meritorious
cases towards settlement and exposing frivolous cases as early in the process as
possible.32
However, screening panels are harshly criticized for the delays they force
onto the litigants, the potential evidentiary consequences to the “losing” party,
and the added costs if the ultimate claim ends up going to court anyway.33
Despite the procedural challenges present in a screening panel system, four of
the nine states in the Ninth Circuit have implemented some form of a screening
panel.34
The third major form of action legislatures have taken to deter frivolous
medical malpractice litigation is to expand pleading standards. On their face,
the expanded pleading standards are the simplest manifestation of tort reform.
These standards add the requirement that the claimant attach some form of
evidentiary verification, most commonly an expert affidavit, to the complaint.35
Proponents of the expanded pleading standard tout it as a way to “streamline
and expedite medical malpractice cases and lower overall costs.”36 They fur-
ther argue that the expanded pleading standard is a more efficient method than
a screening panel system to quickly eliminate frivolous lawsuits because it
requires an expert’s good faith assessment that the claim is meritorious.37
Despite the superficial simplicity of the expanded pleading standard, pre-
litigation limitations were met with strong opposition.38 Depending on the spe-
cific textual nature of the statute, complaints that failed to satisfy the expanded
similar statutory measures were found to be unconstitutional limitations on the right to a jury
trial.
28 Macchiaroli, supra note 16, at 186.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Hubbard, supra note 9, at 522–23.
34 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-11 (West 2008 & Supp.
2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1001 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-104 (2009).
35 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190A (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41A.071 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011).
36 Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790, 794 (Nev. 2006).
37 Id.
38 Brett J. Blank, Note, Medical Malpractice/Civil Procedure—Trap for the Unwary: The
2005 Amendments to Connecticut’s Certificate of Merit Statute, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
453, 455–56 (2009).
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pleading statute could be dismissed with or without prejudice.39 There was
added confusion under the expanded pleading statutes over which actions were
actually covered and whether actions such as cross-claims, counterclaims, and
impleaders required expert affidavits as well.40
The nationwide tort reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s left medical
malpractice dotted with noneconomic damages caps, screening panels, and
expanded pleading standards, along with other legislative and common law
remedies such as comparative liability schemes, insurance reforms, etc.41
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NEVADA—
FROM PANELS TO PLEADINGS
A. Screening Panels in Nevada
The Nevada medical malpractice screening panels were originally adopted
in 1985 as Nevada’s response to the tort reform crisis of the mid-1980s.42
Before the statute’s repeal, Nevada had screening panels comprising lawyers,
doctors, or dentists (depending on the type of malpractice alleged), and the
chairperson of the screening panel (usually an attorney or judge).43 All medical
malpractice actions were subject to review by the screening panels before they
were eligible for hearing before the district court.44 Any case filed in district
court without first going through a screening panel (or otherwise failing to
comply with the mechanical requirements of the screening panel) was “subject
to dismissal without prejudice.”45 The screening panel’s final rulings had evi-
dentiary value at any subsequent proceeding on that issue, though the legisla-
ture was careful to limit that value to the final conclusion of the panel.46
Though the screening panels did have a demonstrable effect in limiting the
number of frivolous medical malpractice cases filed in district courts, there was
a new crisis on the horizon.47
B. The Medical Malpractice Crisis of 2002
The sweeping medical malpractice reforms of 2002 came in response to
several factors. The first factor was a rise in the number of medical malpractice
39 Melinda L. Stroub, Note, The Unforeseen Creation of a Procedural Minefield—New
Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit Statute Spurs Litigation and Expense in its Interpretation and
Application, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 279, 293–94 (2002).
40 Szydel v. Markman, 117 P.3d 200, 201 (Nev. 2005) (ruling that res ipsa loquitor case did
not require expert affidavits under Nevada’s expanded pleading standard).
41 See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 9, at 475–76.
42 See supra Part I.
43 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.003-069 (2001) (repealed 2002).
44 Id. § 41A.016(1) (repealed 2002).
45 Id.
46 Id. § 41A.016(2) (repealed 2002).
47 Chris Di Edoardo, Malpractice Lawsuits Feed Insurance Debate, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.
(Mar. 4, 2002), http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Mar-04-Mon-2002/news/182
19452.html.
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cases filed each year prior to 2002.48 In Clark County alone, there were 133
medical malpractice lawsuits filed in 1998, 148 in 1999, and 158 in 2000.49 A
series of exorbitantly high verdicts in 2001 helped urge policy makers toward
reform.50 The jury awarded 6 million dollars to the plaintiff in Watts v. Reliable
Medical Care, 5.4 million dollars in Banks v. Sunrise Hospital, and 4.6 million
in Debourg v. Southwest Medical.51 Following the adverse trends in medical
malpractice, several large insurance companies responded by no longer carry-
ing medical malpractice coverage.52 The snowball effect continued, as insurers
like the St. Paul companies departed Nevada, which left doctors with skyrock-
eting insurance premiums or an absence of coverage altogether.53 As a direct
consequence of the insurance crisis, physicians began closing their practices if
they were unwilling to pay the exorbitant premiums or unable to obtain mal-
practice coverage altogether.54 The crisis reached critical mass when University
Medical Center (UMC), Southern Nevada’s state-designated Level I Trauma
Center,55 closed its doors to patients in response to mass resignations by doc-
tors unable to secure malpractice insurance.56 UMC’s closure led Governor
Kenny Guinn’s political opponents to call for exercise of his emergency
powers.57
The confluence of rising case volumes, shockingly high award amounts,
and the severely adverse effects that rising malpractice insurance premiums had
on the local medical community led Governor Guinn to call a special session of
the legislature.58 California was the early inspiration for tort reform during the
special session in Carson City.59 Doctors in Nevada hoped for reforms as
restrictive as those passed in California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform
48 Joelle Babula, Medical Malpractice: Rising Insurance Costs Threaten Care, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., July 1, 2001, at 1B, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2001/Jul-
01-Sun-2001/news/16437839.html.
49 Id.
50 Di Edoardo, supra note 47.
51 Id.
52 Id. St. Paul was only one example of an insurance company discontinuing medical mal-
practice coverage in Nevada during this time period. “[S]ince insurance companies set their
premiums on a regional or state basis, and they perceived Nevada juries to be operating with
a jackpot mentality, Nevada became a bad place to do business.” Katherine A. Keeley, A
Doctor’s Gamble in Nevada, HARV. MED. ALUMNI BULL., Summer 2004, http://harvard
medicine.hms.harvard.edu/doctoring/health/gamble.php.
53 Di Edoardo, supra note 47.
54 Joelle Babula, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Operation Special Session,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 28, 2002, at 23A, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_
home/2002/Jul-28-Sun-2002/news/19271188.html.
55 About Us, U. MED. CENTER, https://www.umcsn.com/Footer/About-UMC-of-Southern-
Nevada-Index.aspx?intMenuID=6600&intPageID=305 (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
56 Joelle Babula, Liability Concerns: Trauma Center Closes; ERs Gear Up, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., July 4, 2002, at 1A, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/
Jul-04-Thu-2002/news/19117587.html.
57 Sean Whaley, Neal Urges Guinn to Declare Emergency, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 4,
2002, at 4A, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Jul-04-Thu-2002/
news/19118762.html.
58 Babula, supra note 56.
59 Joelle Babula, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: California Cited as Reform
Model, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 28, 2002, at 27A, available at http://www.reviewjournal.
com/lvrj_home/2002/Jul-28-Sun-2002/news/19261838.html.
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Act (MICRA).60 The principle provision of MICRA that Nevada doctors hoped
to adopt was its strict cap on noneconomic damages.61 Lawmakers moved
quickly and passed the comprehensive tort reform package just over four days
after the special session came to order.62
Nevada’s current medical malpractice landscape began taking shape with
the passage of Assembly Bill 1 of the Eighteenth Special Session (AB 1) in
August 2002.63 AB 1 included provisions for caps on noneconomic damages
(subject to limitations),64 a state-wide dissolution of the health-screening
panels,65 and an expanded pleading standard for medical malpractice actions.66
The expanded pleading standard was expressly designed to replace the health
screening panels.67 The new standard’s proponents believed that if the screen-
ing panels were sacrificed to speed up access to the courts, the stringent affida-
vits had to be preserved to guard against an increase in frivolous filings.68
Though some legislators feared that the cost of a substantive, pretrial expert
affidavit was nothing more than “the equivalent of a huge filing fee,”69 the
bill’s supporters assuaged those fears by pointing out the similarity in cost
between the proposed system and the fees paid by those filing under the health
screening panels.70 The only change to the expanded pleading standard
between the proposed version and what ultimately passed in the legislature was
a slightly expanded definition of acceptable expertise.71 NRS 41A.071 codified
the expanded pleading standard from AB 1.72
C. NRS 41A.071 as Interpreted by the Supreme Court of Nevada
The expanded pleading standard in Nevada represented a more efficient
alternative to the health screening panels.73 NRS 41A.071, in its entirety, reads:
If an action for medical malpractice or dental malpractice is filed in the district court,
the district court shall dismiss the action, without prejudice, if the action is filed
without an affidavit, supporting the allegations contained in the action, submitted by
a medical expert who practices or has practiced in an area that is substantially similar
to the type of practice engaged in at the time of the alleged malpractice.74
60 Id.
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
62 See Editorial, Now Let’s Wait and See, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 2, 2002, at 10B, availa-
ble at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/Aug-02-Fri-2002/opinion/19323627.
html.
63 See generally Assemb. B. 1, 18th Spec. Sess. (Nev. 2002).
64 Id. § 5.
65 Id. § 69.
66 Id. § 8.
67 S. JOURNAL, 18th Spec. Sess., at 159 (Nev. 2002) [hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL], availa-
ble at http://leg.state.nv.us/Session/18th2002Special/journal/Senate/Final/sjss18002.html.
68 See id. at 162.
69 Id. at 163 (comment by Sen. Coffin).
70 Id. (comment by Mr. Cotton: “It is the equivalent of the screening panel costs that they
incurred anyway.”).
71 See id. at 164.
72 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009).
73 See SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 163.
74 § 41A.071.
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The Supreme Court of Nevada’s first opportunity to interpret NRS
41A.071 was in Borger v. Eighth Judicial District Court.75 This case focused
more on the nature of the affidavit required by the statute than the nature of the
dismissal required. In Borger, plaintiff Borger sought treatment for “recurrent
lower digestive tract difficulties.”76  Borger’s general surgeon (Lovett) and gas-
troenterologist (Desai) both diagnosed Borger with Crohn’s disease.77 Borger
underwent two serious surgical procedures, but his health did not improve.78
Borger sued both Lovett and Desai for malpractice when subsequent examina-
tions by Dr. Kudisch revealed that the diagnosis of Crohn’s disease was incor-
rect.79 After the initial procedural difficulties surrounding the cross-over of the
health screening panels and the new procedures were resolved,80 Lovett, the
general practitioner, moved for dismissal under the health screening panel stan-
dards.81 He argued that a gastroenterologist was too dissimilar from a general
surgeon to provide a sufficient expert affidavit under the statute, and that the
statute required the complaint to be dismissed upon such a failure.82 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, and on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Nevada reversed, holding that the statute only “requires that the affiant practice
in an area ‘substantially similar’ to that in which the defendant engaged, giving
rise to the malpractice action.”83
The Court used Borger as an opportunity to expound, in dictum, on some
of the particular aspects of NRS 41A.071, even though it decided the case
under the old health screening panel rules. The Court stated that dismissal was
the appropriate response for a complete failure to attach an affidavit.84 The
Court was silent on the issue of amendments as a remedy to deficient com-
plaints, effectively leaving the matter to future courts to decide.85
The next challenge to the expanded pleading statutes came in Szydel v.
Markman.86 The Markman holding focused on whether or not the affidavit
requirements of 41A.071 extended to cases alleging res ipsa loquitor theories of
medical malpractice.87 Following a breast lift, Dr. Markman allegedly left a
surgical needle in Ms. Szydel’s right breast.88 The health screening panel dis-
missed Szydel’s complaint without prejudice.89 Szydel filed a new complaint
under Nevada’s res ipsa loquitor statute, NRS 41A.100,90 but declined to attach
75 Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court., 102 P.3d 600, 603–06 (Nev. 2004).
76 Id. at 601.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 601–02.
79 Id. at 602.
80 Id. at 603.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 605.
84 Id. at 606.
85 Id.
86 Szydel v. Markman, 117 P.3d 200, 201–07 (Nev. 2005).
87 Id. at 205.
88 Id. at 201.
89 Id. at 202. “The panel then informed Szydel by letter that her complaint was procedurally
deficient and advised her that . . . any subsequent filing would be considered a new com-
plaint.” Id.
90 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.100 (2009).
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an affidavit,91 prompting Markman to move for dismissal under NRS
41A.071.92 The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that complaints filed under
NRS 41A.100 do not require an expert affidavit and were therefore not subject
to motions for dismissal under NRS 41A.071.93
In this second Supreme Court of Nevada interpretation of NRS 41A.071 in
less than two years, the Court reiterated the policy behind the statute without
making it binding precedent.94 As in Borger, the Court reinforced mandatory
dismissal as the appropriate remedy for complaints that fail to attach an expert
affidavit in accordance with NRS 41A.071 (excluding res ipsa loquitor
complaints).95
The Supreme Court of Nevada finally directly addressed expert affidavits
in Washoe Medical Center v. Second Judicial District Court.96 Washoe was the
Court’s most significant step in defining the nature of a complaint’s dismissal
under 41A.071. Billie Faye Barker sued her doctor and the Washoe Medical
Center for negligence, filing her complaint one day before the statute of limita-
tions ran.97 Barker failed to attach an expert affidavit as required by NRS
41A.071, and Washoe moved to dismiss.98 Before the district court could rule
on Washoe’s motion to dismiss, Barker filed an amended complaint that
included an expert affidavit as well as the plaintiff’s opposition to Washoe’s
dismissal motion.99 Arguing that NRS 41A.071 does not allow a plaintiff to
attach a missing affidavit as an amendment, Washoe moved to strike the
amended complaint.100 The district court upheld the amended complaint as
valid under NRCP Rule 15(a).101 Washoe filed a petition for a writ of manda-
mus, challenging the order upholding the amended complaint.102 The Supreme
Court of Nevada concluded that the use of the word “shall” in NRS 41A.071103
denoted a mandatory dismissal, not a discretionary one.104 The Court further
stated that failure to attach an expert affidavit rendered the case void ab ini-
tio105 and legally nonexistent.106 The Court finally stated that no amendments
are permitted for any complaint dismissed for failure to comply with NRS
41A.071.107 Consequently, the Washoe holding formally codified as precedent
91 Szydel, 117 P.3d at 202.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 204.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 205.
96 Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790, 791 (Nev. 2006).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 791–92.
100 Id. at 792.
101 Id.; see also NEV. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (allowing a plaintiff to amend a complaint once as a
matter of course before a responsive pleading is served).
102 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 792.
103 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009).
104 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 793.
105 Void ab initio means “[n]ull from the beginning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1604 (8th
ed. 2004).
106 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 793–94.
107 Id.
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the dicta from Borger and Szydel.108 The Court recognized that its interpreta-
tion of NRS 41A.071 appeared harsh, but it invoked language from a Minne-
sota Supreme Court decision to explain that it did so in a fair way.109
In finding that NRS 41A.071 requires mandatory dismissal of complaints
lacking an expert affidavit, the Supreme Court of Nevada relied on statutory
interpretation precedent.110 That precedent states that where the language of a
statute is clear on its face, the Court will rely on the plain meaning.111 Also,
when a statute is ambiguous or subject to multiple interpretations, “legislative
intent is controlling.”112 The Court’s ultimate guiding principle is to avoid an
“interpretation that leads to an absurd result.”113 The Court spent the bulk of its
analysis on the phrase “shall dismiss,” holding that the legislature’s choice of
“shall” over “may” indicated a mandatory dismissal.114 However, the majority
opinion overlooked an important phrase in the statute: “without prejudice.”115
The Supreme Court of Nevada extended its interpretation of NRS 41A.071
in Fierle v. Perez.116 Here, the Court interpreted the expanded pleading stan-
dard to also cover complaints filed against professional medical corporations,
as well as the medical staff themselves. Plaintiff Patricia Fierle sought treat-
ment from Dr. Perez and members of his staff following her breast cancer diag-
nosis and subsequent mastectomy.117 During a chemotherapy session, Fierle
suffered “a severe extravasation of chemotherapy” when the catheter used to
deliver the medicine was not properly situated.118 Fierle sued for negligence
but did not attach an expert affidavit to her original complaint.119 She
attempted to cure the defect by filing an amended complaint that included her
expert’s affidavit, but Perez and the other defendants moved to dismiss under
NRS 41A.071.120 The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that Dr. Perez’s profes-
sional medical corporation was protected under NRS 41A.071, and dismissed
the complaint against the corporation for lack of an expert affidavit on initial
filing.121 The Court also held that, even when certain claims within a complaint
did not require an expert affidavit (such as res ipsa loquitor claims), “an
amended complaint may not relate back to a complaint that lacked a required
medical expert affidavit.”122
Following the Court’s decision in Fierle, NRS 41A.071 stands as a bright-
line test for admitting medical malpractice complaints into the judicial system.
108 Id. at 794.
109 Id. at 795 (“[A]lthough ‘the [medical malpractice] statute may have harsh results in
some cases, it cuts with a sharp but clean edge.’” (quoting Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc.,
599 N.W.2d 572, 578 (Minn. 1999))).
110 Id. at 792 & 793 nn.6–10.
111 Id. at 792–93.
112 Id. at 793.
113 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 Id. at 793 & 794 n.17.
115 See id. at 792–95.
116 Fierle v. Perez, 219 P.3d 906, 908 (Nev. 2009).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 908–09 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119 Id. at 909.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 911.
122 Id. at 914.
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The statute’s protections extend from the doctors and nurses to their profes-
sional medical corporations.123 However, the Court’s continued support of the
original Washoe interpretation is still at odds with Nevada’s well-settled com-
mon law doctrines governing statutory interpretation.124
III. QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION IN NRS 41A.071
Though consistent with the legislative intent and arguments supporting the
statute, the Supreme Court of Nevada’s position regarding the meaning of NRS
41A.071 is not consistent with a plain language reading of the statute.125 In
Washoe, the majority opinion based its statutory interpretation of NRS 41A.071
entirely on the meaning of the “shall dismiss” portion of the statute while
neglecting to incorporate the “without prejudice” modifier that immediately
follows it.126 The Court had an opportunity to rectify this error in Fierle, but
instead opted to preserve the interpretation from Washoe.127 The Court’s
refusal to interpret the statute in its entirety is in direct opposition to Nevada’s
common law rules of statutory interpretation.128 The inconsistency between the
plain language of NRS 41A.071 and the Court’s strict adherence to the legisla-
tive intent behind the statute is a flaw that the legislature should remedy
through amending the statute itself.129
Nevada’s common law scheme for statutory interpretation relies first and
foremost on the plain language of the statute, provided that the statute is clear
on its face.130 The courts are only to look beyond the plain meaning when the
statute is so ambiguous that it is susceptible to more than one interpretation.131
NRS 41A.071 expressly provides that a judge “shall dismiss the action, without
prejudice” if it is filed without an appropriate expert affidavit attached to it.132
A plain language reading of this statute would lead the reader to believe that the
dismissal itself is mandatory under the “shall dismiss” provision, but that the
dismissal itself must necessarily be “without prejudice.”133
If the Supreme Court of Nevada strictly followed Nevada’s principles of
statutory interpretation in Washoe, the holding would change drastically. The
Court’s analysis would center on the nature of the compulsory dismissal.
Instead of finding that the claim was dismissed as void ab initio, the Court
would rule that mandatory dismissals under NRS 41A.071 are made without
prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaints and file again. This
interpretation, while completely consistent with the plain meaning of the statu-
123 Id.
124 See infra Part III.
125 See Echols, supra note 13.
126 See Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790, 792–95 (Nev.
2006).
127 Fierle, 219 P.3d at 909.
128 See supra Part II (enumerating Nevada’s common law principles of statutory interpreta-
tion throughout the Washoe analysis).
129 See infra Part IV(B)(2).
130 Beazer Homes Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judical Dist. Ct., 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Nev. 2004).
131 Id.
132 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009).
133 See Echols, supra note 13.
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tory language, runs afoul of the legislative intent behind NRS 41A.071. There
is no lasting consequence for plaintiffs who file deficient complaints under this
hypothetical interpretation. Even the most frivolous complaints are eligible for
amendment, rendering the statute toothless as a protection against frivolous
lawsuits.
The Court in Washoe instead chose to interpret NRS 41A.071 on the
meaning of the “shall dismiss” provision of the statute independently of the
“without prejudice” portion.134 The Court’s implied justification for this came
from the natural progression of Nevada’s statutory interpretation scheme—that
is, “when a statute is . . . ambiguous, . . . we must look beyond its plain mean-
ing.”135 The interpretation of an ambiguous statute is controlled by legislative
intent,136 and the legislative interpretation of NRS 41A.071 supported a dismis-
sal as void ab initio, rendering the complaint legally nonexistent.137
When the Nevada legislature adopted an expanded pleading standard as
one of its methods of controlling medical malpractice litigation, it did so as a
complement to a noneconomic damages cap and at the expense of the previ-
ously implemented health screening panels.138 The underlying policies holisti-
cally remained the same—to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits filed in
district court, lower costs to all litigating parties, and ensure that there is a good
faith standard for the litigation.139 The justification behind making the transi-
tion from screening panels to an expanded pleading standard centered on a
desire to perpetuate all the positive aspects of the screening panel system while
simultaneously “strengthening the requirements for expert witnesses.”140 These
policy goals were explicit in the Court’s decisions each time it interpreted the
dismissal provision of NRS 41A.071.141
Given the important legislative intent behind NRS 41A.071, it is
extremely unlikely that the Court will abandon stare decisis and reverse its
statutory interpretation solely to conform with Nevada’s common law doctrines
of interpretation. The Court also precluded the possibility of allowing amend-
ments to fix defective complaints under the current statutory scheme.142 There-
fore, the most logical remedy to this conflict is for the Nevada Legislature to
amend NRS 41A.071, changing the language to reflect not only the 2002 legis-
lative intent and the subsequent Supreme Court of Nevada decisions that came
from it, but to also mold the statute into a more fair, less draconian measure
that better suits the needs of plaintiffs and defendants alike.
134 Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790, 792–95 (Nev. 2006).
135 Id. at 793.
136 Potter v. Potter, 119 P.3d 1246, 1248 (Nev. 2005).
137 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 793.
138 See generally Assemb. B. 1, 18th Spec. Sess. (Nev. 2002).
139 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 794.
140 Id.
141 See Fierle v. Perez, 219 P.3d 906, 914 (Nev. 2009); Washoe, 148 P.3d at 794; Szydel v.
Markman, 117 P.3d 200, 204 (Nev. 2005); Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 102 P.3d
600, 604 (Nev. 2004).
142 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 793.
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IV. NRS 41A.071 WITH PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The following proposed statute is intended as a replacement for NRS
41A.071. The statute is designed to integrate the Supreme Court of Nevada’s
precedent from Washoe and Fierle with clearer language. The plain language
of the amended statute is consistent with the underlying legislative intent, a
feature that prevents inconsistent interpretations by future courts. The amended
statute also incorporates a savings clause, where certain defective complaints
are expressly given an opportunity to be amended, which is a concession
against the current, more draconian approach of immediate dismissal. Finally,
the amended statute integrates the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct,
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (“NRCP”), and Nevada common law to shift
the responsibility for defective complaints from the plaintiff onto the attorney
filing the complaint.
A. The Newly Proposed Statute
1. If an action for medical malpractice or dental malpractice is filed in the
district court without an affidavit supporting the allegations contained in the
action, the district court shall dismiss the action as void ab initio. The affidavit
must be submitted by a medical expert who practices or has practiced in an area
that is substantially similar to the type of practice engaged in at the time of the
alleged malpractice.
(a) Any attorney filing a complaint in violation of section 1 shall be sub-
ject to sanctions under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.
(b) Any attorney filing a complaint in violation of section 1 shall be pre-
sumed in violation of the attorney’s professional duties as outlined in the
Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1.
2. If an action for medical malpractice or dental malpractice is filed in the
district court with an affidavit attached but the affidavit is found in some way
deficient, the judge shall grant thirty (30) days to amend the complaint pursuant
to NRCP Rule 15(a). If the plaintiff fails to remedy the deficient affidavit
within the time granted, the complaint shall be dismissed as void ab initio.
(a) The judicial grant of leave to amend under Rule 15(a) shall toll the
statute of limitations only for such time as is required to hear the motion on the
amended complaint.
In addition to incorporating NRS 41A.071, the amended statute incorpo-
rates ideas from the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, the Nevada Rules of
Professional Conduct, and other states’ medical malpractice reform laws.143
The amended statute is designed to combine both the mandatory dismissal pro-
visions in which the Supreme Court of Nevada and Legislature have vested so
much interest, as well as new policies protecting the rights of plaintiffs.
143 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009), NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.100 (2009),
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-27-28 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), NEV. R. CIV. P. 15(a), NEV.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1.
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B. Section by Section Analysis
1. Section 1
Section 1 of the proposed statute begins with language almost identical to
the current draft of NRS 41A.071, which requires any complaint filed with no
affidavit whatsoever to be summarily dismissed as void ab initio.144 Unlike the
current draft, the language about dismissal “without prejudice” is eliminated for
clarity. Section 1 of the amended statute retains as much of the original charac-
ter of NRS 41A.071 as possible because it is designed to preserve the Supreme
Court of Nevada’s holdings from Washoe145 and Fierle.146 The new statute
also upholds the original legislative intent behind NRS 41A.071 by continuing
the Court’s tradition of mandatory dismissals for complaints that fail to attach
expert affidavits to medical malpractice complaints. Section 1 of the new stat-
ute will continue to ensure that medical malpractice cases are “filed in good
faith” by mandating the continued presence of the medical expert affidavit.147
Though a mandatory dismissal as being void ab initio may still yield “harsh
results in some cases,”148 the need “to lower costs, reduce frivolous lawsuits,
and ensure that . . . malpractice actions are filed in good faith” far outweighs
the opposing viewpoint.149
Subsection (a) of the amended statute focuses on the first truly novel addi-
tion to the statutory scheme surrounding the expanded pleading standard. The
provisions added in subsection (a) make noncompliance a presumptive viola-
tion of NRCP Rule 11. NRCP Rule 11(b) states that:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocat-
ing) a pleading, . . . an attorney . . . is certifying that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, . . . formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, . . . the
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support . . . .150
The goal of Rule 11 is to ensure that all filings before the Court are made
in an appropriate fashion and to sanction parties who violate the rule.151 One
important note concerning Nevada’s version of Rule 11 and its federal counter-
part is that neither rule requires an affidavit to be filed with a complaint unless
a rule or statute provides otherwise.152 This provision adds a definite incentive
for the attorney to comply with the statute. Not only will the judge summarily
dismiss complaints filed without an affidavit, but the judge must also pursue
sanctions under Rule 11.
The arguments against this provision come principally from the argument
that a sua sponte finding for sanctions removes a portion of the judge’s discre-
144 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009).
145 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 794.
146 Fierle, 219 P.3d at 911.
147 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 159 (comment by Mr. Bradley).
148 Washoe, 148 P.3d at 795 (quoting Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572,
578 (Minn. 1999)).
149 Szydel v. Markman, 117 P.3d 200, 204 (Nev. 2005).
150 NEV. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
151 See NEV. R. CIV. P. 11.
152 NEV. R. CIV. P. 11(a), accord FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
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tion from the proceeding.153 This is unfounded due to the statute’s construction.
If the statute had a new, compulsory sanctions provision built into it that was
not grounded in a different rules-based framework, it would almost certainly
act as a usurpation of judicial authority. In contrast, this proposed amended
statute states that the attorney “shall be subject to sanctions under Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.”154 While the term “shall” denotes that the
attorney is automatically subject to Rule 11, the rule itself contains specific
mechanisms that give the judge discretionary control as to the conditions of the
sanctions themselves.155 The policy behind the inclusion of this provision is
inherently consistent with the policy behind Rule 11. Both the expanded plead-
ing standard and the civil procedure rule governing representations to the court
exist to ensure that attorneys file in good faith and to ensure that frivolous cases
are eliminated.156 Subsection (a) of the statute can work in concert with the
existing rules to further protect against frivolous medical malpractice litigation
by using the existing NRCP to eliminate the possibility that the statute will
infringe on judicial providence.
Subsection (b) is another new addition to the expanded pleading standard
that exists to both curtail frivolous litigation and to give plaintiffs injured by
attorney misconduct a new possible avenue for recovery. The new provision
adds a presumption that whenever an attorney files a complaint in violation of
Section 1 of the statute, that attorney is legally presumed to have violated Rule
3.1 of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.1 holds that “[a] law-
yer shall not bring . . . a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”157 The
Nevada legislature adopted this rule verbatim from the corresponding model
rule.158 The policy behind Rule 3.1 is that “[w]hat is required of lawyers is that
they inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases and . . . that they
can make good faith arguments in support of their clients’ positions.”159 The
Supreme Court of Nevada recently upheld the view that “[a]n attorney’s ethical
duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally solemn duty
to comply with the law and standards of professional conduct.”160 Due to Rule
3.1’s presence in the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys in
Nevada are already under a duty to exercise due care in ensuring that they file
cases in good faith.161
The expanded pleading standard present in both the proposed amended
statute and NRS 41A.071 elevates the attorney’s minimum duty by requiring
153 Benjamin Grossberg, Comment, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie
Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217,
256–57 (2010).
154 See supra Part IV.A.1(a).
155 NEV. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
156 Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790, 794 (Nev. 2006); see
also Grossberg, supra note 153, at 250.
157 NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1.
158 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1 (2006).
159 Id. at cmt. 2.
160 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1622 (2010)
(quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168, (1986)).
161 NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1.
246 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:231
the attorney to engage in at least minimal discovery to ascertain the nature of
the clients’ claims.162 By including the language relating to Rule 3.1 in subsec-
tion (b), the amended statute carries additional weight by attaching the possibil-
ity of bar sanctions for the intentional filing of facially defective complaints.163
The policies behind this subsection remain identical to those behind the statute
as a whole: to reduce the number of frivolous cases filed and to ensure that
medical malpractice actions are undertaken after a good faith effort is made to
ascertain the validity of the allegations made in the complaint.164
As the amended statute makes filing a complaint without an expert affida-
vit a presumptive violation of Rule 3.1, attorneys would then be subject to
discipline under Rule 8.4, which makes it attorney misconduct for any attorney
to “[v]iolate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.”165 The
State Bar of Nevada is responsible for determining the level of sanctions meted
out for violations of the rules of professional conduct.166 Punishments range
from disbarment to private censure,167 and the disciplinary committees take
into account the attorney’s prior conduct and any attempts to mitigate the dam-
age from the infraction when deciding the penalty.168 This provision might
expose attorneys to dramatically increased professional risks, putting the attor-
ney’s license at risk for filing a medical malpractice complaint. However, those
concerns are mitigated by the disciplinary process.169 Much like the Rule 11
provision in subsection (a), subsection (b) only subjects attorneys to the same
liability for which the attorney is already accountable.170 The attorney is only at
risk of professional sanctions if he or she files a complaint with no expert affi-
davit attached to it, and as the act of obtaining and attaching such an affidavit is
a check on the good faith nature of a medical malpractice claim,171 the attor-
ney’s actions are already facially in violation of Rule 3.1.
One significant collateral outcome of subsection (b) is that the presump-
tive violation of the attorney’s professional responsibility gives a plaintiff
injured by that violation a possible evidentiary advantage should the plaintiff
choose to pursue a legal malpractice claim against the attorney. A legal mal-
practice claim requires:
(1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a duty owed to the client by the attorney to use
such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity possess
in exercising and performing the tasks which they undertake; (3) a breach of that
duty; (4) the breach being the proximate cause of the client’s damages; and (5) actual
loss or damage resulting from the negligence.172
A majority of jurisdictions view a violation of a professional conduct rule
as “relevant to the standard of care,” but not sufficient to create a cause of
162 See SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 159.
163 See supra Part IV.A.1(b).
164 Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790, 794 (Nev. 2006).
165 NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(a).
166 See NEV. SUP. CT. R. 99.
167 NEV. SUP. CT. R. 102.
168 NEV. SUP. CT. R. 102.5.
169 Id.
170 See supra Part IV.A.1.
171 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 159.
172 Mainor v. Nault, 101 P.3d 308, 324 (Nev. 2004).
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action by itself.173 A plaintiff who loses the right to litigate a medical malprac-
tice claim because the plaintiff’s attorney filed a complaint without an expert
affidavit, which resulted in a dismissal as void ab initio, would look to the
attorney’s presumptive violation of Rule 3.1 under subsection (b) as a strong
indication that the attorney breached the duty of care. The plaintiff would still
have to prove the remaining elements of a legal malpractice claim against the
attorney—that the plaintiff suffered actual damages as a result of the breach of
duty by the attorney.174 Nevada’s standard on damages requires the damages to
be certain, and not contingent on an appeal.175 The only certain damages for a
plaintiff under these circumstances would be the attorney’s fees already spent
in pursuit of the litigation.
Subsections (a) and (b) may seem like a draconian approach to limiting
medical malpractice litigation, given its severe repercussions for attorneys who
violate the statute by filing facially deficient complaints.176 However, the
impact that the statute is likely to have is not on the skilled/experienced litiga-
tor or even the average attorney, but on those attorneys who do not exercise
proper care in the execution of their duties as litigators or those attorneys trying
to dabble in medical malpractice casework. The amended statute is specific in
its requirements concerning attaching an expert affidavit, and an attorney who
chooses to file a complaint without such an affidavit is doing so with either
complete disregard for the statute or a complete lack of preparation and knowl-
edge in the area of medical malpractice litigation.
Section 1 of the amended statute may have the unintended consequence of
condensing the practice of medical malpractice law into the hands of a smaller
number of more experienced attorneys. Attorneys who specialize in particular
areas of legal “practice can master the legal knowledge and skill necessary to
practice in their field at a high level of competence.”177 “Lawyers who possess
greater knowledge of a practice area . . . are less likely to be sued for malprac-
tice than lawyers who lack such knowledge . . . . [E]xperts are less likely to
make professional errors than non-experts.”178 It is easy to envision more gen-
eralized personal injury practitioners losing this aspect of their business if the
amended statute does push the practice of medical malpractice law further
towards formal specializations. This small potential loss of business, however,
is logically offset by the increase in quality of representation and the prospect
that some personal injury attorneys may find themselves the new breed of spe-
cialist in medical malpractice litigation.
Section 1 and its two subsections create a bright-line standard that renders
any complaint filed without an affidavit dismissed upon filing as void ab initio.
The statute also subjects the attorney responsible for the filing to possible sanc-
tions under both NRCP Rule 11 and the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct
173 Id. at 320.
174 Id. at 324.
175 Semenza v. Nev. Med. Liab. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 184, 186 (Nev. 1988).
176 See supra Part IV.A.1(a)–(b).
177 Gary Munneke, Requiem for a GP: The End of an Era, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Feb. 2011,
at 10, 12.
178 Id. at 13.
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Rule 3.1.179 This new rule should substantially limit frivolous complaints by
requiring an appropriate expert affidavit while simultaneously discouraging
attorneys from filing facially defective complaints just to cover for their own
negligence.
2. Section 2
Section 2 is another entirely new addition to NRS 41A.071, and includes
terms under which a defective complaint may be amended to avoid dismis-
sal.180 The expert affidavits that must be attached to medical malpractice com-
plaints in Nevada are governed both by the expanded pleading statutes181 and
the general evidentiary statute within the overall medical malpractice frame-
work.182 Though the common law and NRS 41A.071 clearly address the out-
come concerning a plaintiff’s motion to amend when no affidavit is attached to
the complaint,183 there is no statutory indication as to the exact mechanics of
what should happen when the plaintiff’s complaint is accompanied by an affi-
davit that does not conform to the evidentiary standards laid out in either of the
aforementioned statutes. Thus, Section 2’s purpose is to formalize the procedu-
ral steps for amending a defective complaint when an affidavit is attached but
the affidavit fails to comply with the Court’s evidentiary expectations. This
serves the twin goals of bringing judicial predictability to the process and of
giving plaintiffs a definite remedy for complaints that would be dismissed out-
right as void ab initio under Section 1’s standards.
Section 2 gives the judge discretion to grant the plaintiff leave to amend
the complaint under NRCP Rule 15.184 Under Rule 15, “a party may amend the
party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party.”185 Section 2 applies when a plaintiff’s attorney submits a complaint
with an affidavit attached that, due to some defect inherent to the affidavit, is
followed by a pre-answer defense motion to dismiss under the statute. The
judge would either rule that there was no actual affidavit attached and dismiss
the complaint outright under Section 1 or hold the complaint defective under
Section 2. If the judge found the affidavit defective under Section 2, the section
encourages the judge to grant the plaintiff leave to amend the pleading under
the terms of NRCP Rule 15. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed pre-
answer, so there is no significant risk to the defendant’s legal interest in this
situation beyond a potential small delay in the trial proceedings while the plain-
tiff secures a compliant affidavit. In the event that the plaintiff fails to secure
such an affidavit, Subsection (a) controls, and the complaint is automatically
dismissed as void ab initio.186
The amendment provision of the proposed statute responds to a principle
argument against the current interpretation of NRS 41A.071, namely the inher-
179 See supra Part IV.A.1.
180 See supra Part IV.A. 2.
181 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009).
182 Id. at § 41A.100.
183 See supra Part III.
184 See supra Part IV.B.
185 NEV. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
186 See supra Part IV.B(a).
Fall 2011] SHIELDING HIPPOCRATES 249
ent contradiction between the wording of NRCP Rule 15 and the Supreme
Court of Nevada’s unwillingness to recognize the possibility of amending a
defective medical malpractice complaint under this statute.187 Amending the
statute to facially allow for the amendment of defective complaints under
clearly defined circumstances gives plaintiffs a way around their attorneys’
potential missteps.
Section 2 is inspired by New Jersey’s expanded pleading standards for
medical malpractice actions, which include a minimum 60-day grace period for
filing the expert affidavit and an exception that allows for actions without
expert affidavits to proceed without such an affidavit.188 The New Jersey stat-
ute allows a plaintiff up to 120 days to amend the complaint by attaching the
expert affidavit.189 Though New Jersey courts have fully adopted this stan-
dard,190 a delay of that size seems inconsistent with Nevada’s legislative goals
of expediting medical malpractice litigation.191 The 30-day provision of Sec-
tion 2 should be a realistic amount of time for a plaintiff’s attorney to seek out a
practicing physician, either locally or nationally, and obtain the requisite
amended affidavit to prevent dismissal of the complaint. If the plaintiff’s attor-
ney is genuinely unable to find a physician anywhere in the nation who is
willing to write an affidavit saying that there is a good faith basis for proceed-
ing with the medical malpractice case, it follows logically that there may not be
a good faith basis for the medical malpractice case to move forward.
Section 2(a) connects the two provisions and is an act of deference
between the new amendment policy and Nevada’s strong policy interest in lim-
iting frivolous malpractice litigation.192 Subsection (a) mandates that if a plain-
tiff is unable to amend the complaint to comply with the statute within the 30-
day period, the judge shall dismiss the complaint as void ab initio, mimicking
the results under Section 1.193 The only significant argument against this provi-
sion posits that the ultimate threat of dismissal hangs over the amendment pro-
cess like the sword of Damocles. This argument ultimately carries little sway
because the claimant’s attorney has plenty of opportunity to ensure compliance
with the statute beyond the amendment provision of Subsection (a), including
performing the appropriate work before initially filing the complaint.
One noticeable feature of the statute is that neither Section 1 nor Section 2
mentions the consequences for a pro se litigant who files a complaint with no
expert affidavit attached. NRS 41A.071 also lacks any formal statutory lan-
guage discussing the nature of pro se filings.194 Conceivably, the provision in
Subsection (a) that subjects the attorney to sanctions under NRCP Rule 11
might also apply in some way to the pro se plaintiff, but the judge would have
discretion under the rule, which says that the sanction “shall be limited to what
187 See Echols supra note 13.
188 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-27-28 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011).
189 Id. § 2A:53A-27.
190 See Ryan v. Renny, 999 A.2d 427, 435–36 (N.J. 2010).
191 Szydel v. Markman, 117 P.3d 200, 204 (Nev. 2005) (discussing the general goals of the
legislation, with expediting the litigation being implicit in the discussion).
192 Id.
193 See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
194 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071 (2009).
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is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated.”195 The pro se plaintiff also has no cause for concern from
Section 1(b) because a pro se plaintiff is likely not a member of the Nevada Bar
Association and cannot be held accountable under the Nevada Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.196
If Section 1 of the proposed amended statute represents Nevada’s protec-
tion against an influx of frivolous medical malpractice litigation, then Section 2
is the people’s shield, providing a meaningful mechanism through which plain-
tiffs and their attorneys can rectify mistakes in their complaints. The harsh or
severe nature of a void ab initio dismissal is tempered by the statutory grant of
an opportunity to amend, something the current statute does not allow in any
way.197 The proposed amended statute is facially clear and remains fair to both
plaintiff and defendant in its role as gatekeeper against frivolous medical mal-
practice lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
The sad reality is that as long as people seek medical treatment, there is a
chance for an adverse outcome. Whether it is a preventable error on the part of
a health care provider, an accident of nature, or a confluence of factors that no
patient would likely survive, the lasting effects of medical error are just as
acute for those family members left behind. The focus should ultimately be on
the efforts of health care providers to mitigate those negative results and man-
age patient expectations, but until those efforts come to fruition the American
legal system is left to determine how to compensate the victims and their fami-
lies. Therein lies the obligation to reform the medical malpractice system to
make certain that the truly injured receive their just compensation and that
those unscrupulous individuals who file baseless claims do not unnecessarily
occupy the courts’ time.
Though the federal government periodically discusses nationwide stan-
dards for medical malpractice reform, as of now it is incumbent on the states to
address the issue. Nevada’s medical malpractice scheme, as it is now, rests on
tenuous ground. Noneconomic damages caps face challenges of application and
constitutionality nationwide, including in Nevada. If Nevada’s damages cap is
ever successfully overturned, the expanded pleading standard of NRS 41A.071
will stand as the lone deterrent against frivolous medical malpractice litigation
and a potential insurance premium disaster. The new version of NRS 41A.071
proposed by this Note strengthens the statute’s ability to prevent frivolous law-
suits from clogging up the judicial system. The proposed statute’s bright-line
rule for successfully filing a medical malpractice complaint is enhanced by
clear and enforceable consequences when an attorney fails to satisfy the statute
while simultaneously showing more compassion to claimants who file defec-
tive complaints.
The proposed amended statute is not designed to ultimately solve the
problem of medical malpractice and the subsequent need for litigation; instead,
195 NEV. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
196 See Nev. SUP. CT. R. 45, 76–77.
197 Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790, 792 (Nev. 2006).
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its explicit goal is to protect the interests of all litigating parties until the time
when that litigation is no longer necessary. Just as a doctor abides by the Hip-
pocratic Oath to “do no harm,” this statute embodies the kind of behaviors that
lawyers would exhibit were they also bound by that Oath.
